Противоречия в стане НАТО углубляются  

Нижеследующяя статья вскрывает глубокие внутрeнние противоречия в стане НАТО в контексте которых и следует рассматривать планы Германии вывести свои войсковые части из Косово.

Уже в начале агрессивной войны против Югославии в марте прошлого года французкая газета «Ле Монд» написала, что война, по существу, война не столько против Югославии, сколько против Европы, что Милошевич и независимая от воли США Югославия, с одной стороны, и евро и процесс европейской интеграции, с другой, в одинаковой степени являются врагами США. Не следует забывать слова выдающегося французкого сосударственного деятеля генерала де Голля, который уже в 60-годах писал, что действительно свободная Европа- это Европа освободившаяся от цепей американской гегемонии.

STRATFOR.COM Global Intelligence Update
07 April 2000

Germany Will Seek Quick Kosovo Exit Strategy

Summary:

The fragile consensus in Germany that has supported German
operations in Kosovo since the beginning of Operation Allied Force
is starting to unravel. Given the uncertainty within the German
government over the future of its Kosovo policy, any serious
pressure from outside the government will result in a rapid
demarche in German support. The end of this consensus will cause
Germany to seek an immediate exit strategy to block the potential
for additional deterioration both at home and abroad.

Analysis:

On April 5, Karl Lamers, the parliamentary foreign policy spokesman
for the opposition Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social
Union (CDU/CSU), suggested in a parliamentary debate that Kosovo be
partitioned. This broke a yearlong truce between government and
opposition over Kosovo policy, eliciting immediate and heated
objections that the option was irresponsible. The current German
coalition has always been doubtful over NATO's goals and intentions
in Kosovo, restrained only by a rigorous holding of the party line
that the Kosovo campaign was a humanitarian intervention. But
events in Kosovo and emerging evidence are undermining the
government's position.

Kosovo is becoming an increasing burden on Germany both
domestically and internationally. Domestically, the government
lives in fear of a firefight between German soldiers and Albanians
or Serbs. German casualties - or even worse, civilian casualties on
the other side - will immediately cause an outcry and generate
potential for serious splits within both governing parties. Both
the Social Democrats (SPD) and the Greens have strong internal
factions that are at best skeptical about German involvement.

Internationally, violence in Kosovo continues to fester, creating a
source of ongoing concern as Germany attempts to maintain warm
relations with Moscow. While Russia has always objected to Kosovo
being split off from Serbia, an ongoing low-level crisis there also
threatens to unhinge German efforts to keep the Cold War from
setting in again. A quick exit at any cost - short of a complete
undermining of NATO - may upset the Russians in the short term, but
it offers Germany the possibility to put the issue behind it in its
pursuit of constructive relations with Russia.
[http://www.stratfor.com/world/Commentaries/0003020245.htm]

In many ways, Germany has always been a fragile partner of the NATO
coalition. During the Kosovo conflict last year, the Germans
expressed alarm at the conflict's implications and worked
diligently behind the scenes to strike a deal with the Russians
that would end the operations and, by extension, limit German
commitments. Germany's Greens, in particular, have reacted strongly
to their leadership's support for NATO's operations, and it is by
the slimmest of margins that Green Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer
has managed to keep a lid on dissent within his own party.
[http://www.stratfor.com/crisis/kosovo/commentary/c9904291507.htm]
[http://www.stratfor.com/world/Commentaries/0003090041.htm].

Other internal issues related to Kosovo include the fact that
Germany harbors 180,000 Kosovar Albanian refugees, whose visas
expired at the end of March. State interior ministers -
particularly those in conservative states - have advocated the
immediate return of these people to Kosovo. The expulsion of
refugees - equal to 10 percent of the total Kosovar Albanian
population - would undermine the Green position that the continuing
operations in Kosovo are humanitarian in nature. Additionally,
outbreaks of violence in Mitrovica and elsewhere are daily
reminders of the considerable risk of German casualties and of last
year's violence when German troops moved into Prizren and killed
Serbs.

Up until recently, the German government - led by Defense Minister
Rudolf Scharping and Fischer - has managed to maintain a shell of
support for German operations in Kosovo. In late March 2000,
however, retired German Brig. Gen. Heinz Loquai asserted in a new
book that the Serbian "Horseshoe Plan" - a key element in
solidifying German support for Operation Allied Force last year -
was actually a creation of the German Defense Ministry.

While Scharping has vigorously denied this allegation, Loquai's
assertion carries some weight. Particularly telling is his
observation that the German government claimed the operation was
named "Potkova" - the Croatian word for horseshoe - rather than
"Potkovica" - the Serbian word. Scharping rebutted Loquai's
statements by saying that details of the "Horseshoe Plan" came from
the German Foreign Ministry, which obtained them either directly or
indirectly from intelligence sources in Bulgaria.

The strident rebuttals of any and all criticism of the German
government's Kosovo policy speaks to the fragility of the consensus
it is trying to hold together. Fischer reacted swiftly April 5 to
Lamers suggestion to partition Kosovo, characterizing it as an
attempt to build a "mythology" surrounding NATO operations in
Kosovo.

The weakness of the German government's position will not be able
withstand a series of telling attacks from the opposition. Up until
now they have been spared this through a tacit agreement between
the government and the CDU/CSU. The conservative Christian
Democrats (CDU), with a long history of NATO support, were quite
willing to let this sensitive issue go unchallenged. However, the
recent weakness of the CDU as a result of corruption scandals and
leadership changes has led it to grasp at any issue that might
undermine the government parties. Seen in this light, the
government's Kosovo policy was an obvious target for criticism.

Germany is now entering a very difficult period in its foreign
policy. Without destroying NATO, Germany will find it just as
difficult to find an exit strategy for Kosovo as it was to build a
consensus for following the U.S. lead last year. Partition - as
suggested by the CDU - is an easy answer but it carries with it
serious risks to other elements of German foreign policy.

Russia has always adamantly opposed splitting off Kosovo from
Serbia - both as a consequence of its pro-Serbian position and from
the risk of setting precedents in Russia. Germany, however, may
also be calculating the ongoing risks and provocations that will
anger Russia if German and NATO troops stay in Kosovo. German
officials may have decided that removing the bandage quickly and
risking short-term Russian anger is better than permitting the
continuing risk of confrontations concerning Kosovo.

The German dilemma over Kosovo will only get worse. Continuing
operations represent daily, serious risks for German foreign policy
and even the survival of the government itself. With the opposition
now signaling that Kosovo is fair game in the policy debates in
Berlin, this pressure will only increase. Germany is already
casting about for "safe" solutions to the problems in the Balkans.
For example, Bodo Hombach, who is very close to German Chancellor
Gerhard Schroeder, recently spearheaded an effort that raised $2.3
billion in aid for the Balkans.

Germany will not have the luxury of waiting for an economic revival
to smooth relations in the Balkans. Instead, it will become an
increasingly loud proponent of a quick NATO withdrawal from Kosovo,
whatever the short-term costs. It is not likely that Germany will
risk the cost of a unilateral withdrawal for fear of destroying
NATO - although a reduction in the troop strength is a definite
possibility. It will, however, make it clear in both Brussels and
Washington that patience is limited when it comes to Kosovo.